In this work, we introduce families of multimodal maps based on logistic map, i.e., families of m-modal maps are defined on an interval I ⊂ ℝ, which is partitioned into non-uniform subdomains, with m ∈ ℕ. Because the subdomains of the partition are not uniform, each subdomain contains a unimodal map, given by the logistic map, that can have different heights. Therefore, we give the necessary and sufficient conditions for these modal maps present a multimodal family of m-modal maps, i.e., (...) a bifurcation parameter can set a unimodal map, a bimodal map, up to a m -modal map. Some numerical examples are given according to the developed theory. Some numerical examples are given in accordance with the developed theory. (shrink)

En este artículo se fundamenta y promueve la necesidad de comprensión de lo local como escala de lo social, y como una producción social resultante de la acción e interacción de agentes que actúan desde diferentes escalas, intereses y objetivos. Se sostiene, además que ello ha sido un campo analítico de bajo desarrollo en Chile y América Latina, aunque se puede inventariar un conjunto de aproximaciones que directa o indirectamente se han referido a ello en el pasado. Por otro lado, (...) se incentiva y se problematiza una orientación política que, dentro de un plano de “estilos de desarrollo”, valorice las dinámicas endógenas locales, es decir con protagonismo de los agentes locales. Ello se fundamenta en la necesidad de hacer visible y proyectar poderes periféricos velados por un cierto “centralismo intelectual”, por la importancia que la calidad de los territorios locales tienen en nuestras vidas, por la necesidad de saldar cuentas con una construcción de “lo nacional” que oprimió diversidades y, finalmente, para evitar la imposición de racionalidades y agentes globales que, bajo un discurso de universalidad, impongan intereses particulares. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizamos las relaciones de complementación en la lengua toba hablada en el este de la provincia de Formosa en estrecha correlación con construcciones seriales simétricas. Se trata de dos tipos de cláusulas complejas cercanas –argumentos compartidos, los dos o más verbos son finitos, no existe marca evidente de subordinación en términos sintácticos– por lo cual los límites entre ambas no resultan evidentes. Por este motivo, proponemos un abordaje de tipo funcional de la subordinación. En línea con la (...) propuesta de Cristófaro, entendemos la subordinación como una relación asimétrica entre dos eventos y no como un tipo específico de cláusula. Proponemos que no existe la complementación en esta lengua como tipo de cláusula y que la “incrustación” no es un criterio que nos permita abordar el fenómeno. El corpus se compone de cinco horas de texto libre narrativo relevado en sucesivos trabajos de campo en las comunidades tobas de Barrio Nam Qom y la ex Colonia secular Bartolomé de Las Casas. (shrink)

This paper shows the brain correlates of Cloninger’s personality model during the presentation of social scenarios under positive or negative valence situations. Social scenarios were constructed when participants played the Dictator game with two confederates that had two opposites roles as the cooperator and non-cooperator. Later the same day during a fMRI scanning session, participants read negative and positive situations that happened to confederates in the past. Participants were asked to think “how do you think those people felt during that (...) situation?” A dissimilarity matrix between stimuli were obtained from fMRI results. Results shown that Harm Avoidance trait people make use of right middle frontal gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop. Cooperation as a trait makes use of the right superior temporal gyrus and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in positive social scenarios. Finally, Self-directedness trait people make use of the right inferior parietal lobe to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in negative social scenarios and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and Strangers. An intuitive link between discrimination findings and behavioral patterns of those personality traits is proposed. (shrink)

Selective attention depends on goal-directed and stimulus-driven modulatory factors, each relayed by different brain rhythms. Under certain circumstances, stress-related states can change the balance between goal-directed and stimulus-driven factors. However, the neuronal mechanisms underlying these changes remain unclear. In this study, we explored how psychosocial stress can modulate brain rhythms during an attentional task and a task-free period. We recorded the EEG and ECG activity of 42 healthy participants subjected to either the Trier Social Stress Test, a controlled procedure to (...) induce stress, or a comparable control protocol, flanked by an attentional task, a 90 s of task-free period and a state of anxiety questionnaire. We observed that psychosocial stress induced an increase in heart rate, self-reported anxiety, and alpha power synchronization. Also, psychosocial stress evoked a relative beta power increase during correct trials of the attentional task, which correlates positively with anxiety and heart rate increase, and inversely with attentional accuracy. These results suggest that psychosocial stress affects performance by redirecting attentional resources toward internal threat-related thoughts. An increment of endogenous top-down modulation reflected an increased beta-band activity that may serve as a compensatory mechanism to redirect attentional resources toward the ongoing task. The data obtained here may contribute to designing new ways of clinical management of the human stress response in the future and could help to minimize the damaging effects of persistent stressful experiences. (shrink)

I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.

We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...) intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind. (shrink)

It is often thought that bets on the truth of known propositions become irrational if the losing costs are high enough. This is typically taken to count against the view that knowledge involves assigning credence 1. I argue that the irrationality of such extreme bets can be explained by considering the interactions between the agent and the bookmaker. More specifically, the agent’s epistemic perspective is altered by the fact that the bookmaker proposes that unusual type of bet. Among other things, (...) being willing to offer a bet with unnecessarily harmful losing costs is likely to undermine the baseline level of trustworthiness required for it to be rational to engage in betting exchanges. This sort of explanation does not require granting either that we assign credence lower than 1 to known propositions or that knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes. Moreover, I show that, in our ordinary lives, we frequently perform actions that we know would be disastrous if certain conditions did not obtain. This behaviour can be seen as a form of implicit extreme betting and, nevertheless, it is often rational. (shrink)

Nuestro principal objetivo en este trabajo es el de analizar si es posible construir sistemas lógicos temporales-epistémicos lo suficientemente satisfactorios. Sin embargo, las principales dificultades para lograr este propósito provienen del hecho de tener que combinar una perspectiva temporal absoluta con una perspectiva epistémica relativa a cada agente; es decir, por un lado, los instantes de tiempo vienen determinados desde el punto de vista de un observador situado fuera del mundo, y, por otro lado, las alternativas epistémicas de cada agente (...) son relativas a dicho agente. Pensamos que algunas de estas dificultades podrían ser superadas con la ayuda de las lógicas híbridas, puesto que este tipo de lógicas simplifica la combinación de sistemas temporales y epistémicos, y así podemos evitar tener que construir modelos excesivamente complicados. Our main goal in this paper is to analyse if it is possible to build some suitable Temporal-Epistemic Systems. However, the main difficulties in order to aim this goal come from the fact of having to combine an absolute temporal perspective with a relative epistemic perspective; that is, on one hand, temporal points are determined from the point of view of an observer placed outside the world, and, on the other hand, the epistemic alternatives of each agent are relative to that agent. We think that some of these difficulties could be solved with the help of hybrid logics, because this kind of logics simplifies the combination of temporal and epistemic systems, and so we can avoid building highly complicated models. (shrink)

AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems (AIS) are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from the (...) public and private organisations. The purpose of this article is to offer a mapping of the technological architectures that support AIS, under the specific focus of the moral agency. Through a literature research and reflection process, the following areas are covered: a brief introduction and review of the literature on the topic of moral agency; an analysis using the BDI logic model (Bratman 1987); an elemental review of artificial ‘reasoning’ architectures in AIS; the influence of the data input and the data quality; AI systems’ positioning in decision support and decision making scenarios; and finally, some conclusions are offered about regarding the potential loss of moral control by humans due to AIS. This article contributes to the field of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence by providing a discussion for developers and researchers to understand how and under what circumstances the ‘human subject’ may, totally or partially, lose moral control and ownership over AI technologies. The topic is relevant because AIS often are not single machines but complex networks of machines that feed information and decisions into each other and to human operators. The detailed traceability of input-process-output at each node of the network is essential for it to remain within the field of moral agency. Moral agency is then at the basis of our system of legal responsibility, and social approval is unlikely to be obtained for entrusting important functions to complex systems under which no moral agency can be identified. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of the thesis that metaphors are indispensable for grasping and expressing certain propositions. I defend this possibility against the objection that, if metaphors express propositions, once these propositions are identified they should be specifiable by non‐metaphorical means. I argue that this objection loses its strength if one adopts a Wittgensteinian, particularist view of thought, according to which grasping a propositional thought requires the ongoing exercise of a suitable skill often not characterizable by algorithmic rules. Within (...) this particularist framework, thus, it becomes possible that metaphorical skills have an indispensable role in cognition and communication. (shrink)

Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is to present objections to recent proposed (...) solutions to this problem, according to which the responses of deceived agents would be rationalized by facts about how things appear to them. My positive aim is to argue that accounts of reasons in terms of apparent reasons manage to capture the intuitions that seem to favor a normative account of rationality. (shrink)

Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay : 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success (...) of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn’s. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories aspire to develop a naturalistic account of intentional agency and thought by appeal to biological teleology. In particular, most versions of teleosemantics study the emergence of intentionality in terms of biological purposes introduced by Darwinian evolution. The aim of this paper is to argue that the sorts of biological purposes identified by these evolutionary approaches do not allow for a satisfactory account of intentionality. More precisely, I claim that such biological purposes should be attributed to reproductive chains or (...) lineages, rather than to individual traits or organisms, whereas the purposes underlying intentional agency and thought are typically attributed to individuals. In the last part of the paper I suggest that related difficulties are also faced, despite appearances, by accounts of intentionality relying on alternative organizational approaches to biological teleology. (shrink)

This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) remarks on moral matters.

Traditional expressivists want to preserve a contrast between the representational use of declarative sentences in descriptive domains and the non-representational use of declarative sentences in other areas of discourse. However, expressivists have good reasons to endorse minimalism about representational notions, and minimalism seems to threaten the existence of such a bifurcation. Thus, there are pressures for expressivists to become global anti-representationalists. In this paper I discuss how to reconstruct in non-representationalist terms the sort of bifurcation traditional expressivists were after. My (...) proposal is that the relevant bifurcation can be articulated by appeal to the contrast between relativistic and non-relativistic assertoric practices. I argue that this contrast, which can be specified without appeal to representational notions, captures the core intuitions behind the expressivist bifurcation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.

The goal of this dissertation is to offer a practice-based account of intentionality. My aim is to examine what sort of practices agents have to engage in so as to count as talking and thinking about the way the world is – that is, what sort of practices count as representational. Representational practices answer to the way the world is: what is correct within such practices depends on the way things are, rather than on the attitudes of agents. An account (...) of representation must explain how such objective standards of correctness are introduced in human practices: one must explain how the world gets to have a say in what is correct in human discursive practices. Roughly, my proposal is that human discursive practices become responsive to the way things are by virtue of involving practical interactions with the world. The outcomes of these interactions depend on the way the world is and the evaluation of such outcomes contributes to determining which moves within the practice count as correct. Due to our practical engagement with the environment, thus, the world gets to constrain discursive practices. In order to flesh out my proposal, I develop a practice-based characterization of intentional or representational content. On this sort of approach, expressing intentional contents is seen as a matter of playing a certain role in relevant practices, rather than as a matter of engaging in some word-world relation. The expression of content, thus, is explained in terms of use. In particular, I adopt an inferentialist perspective, according to which discursive moves express contents because of their role in practices of giving and asking for reasons. I investigate how practical engagement with the environment introduces friction with the world in these practices of giving and asking for reasons. One of the main conclusions reached in the dissertation is that defeasibility is an essential feature of objective representational practices – so that attributions of representational correctness are revisable in an open-ended way. The discussion of defeasible reasoning – and of the way in which defeasibility shapes human representational practices – is a central point of this dissertation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSeveral authors have claimed that indicative conditionals are sensitive to the epistemic perspective of agents. According to this sort of view, the truth of an indicative conditional depends on the background evidence of some relevant agent or group of agents. In this paper, I argue that the context-dependence of indicative conditionals goes beyond this. Indicative conditionals are not only sensitive to the evidence of agents, but also to contextual factors that determine what is inferable from such background evidence. More specifically, (...) my proposal is that when the inference associated with a conditional is defeasible, the truth of that conditional is sensitive to practical stakes. (shrink)

There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, an agent with incomplete (...) evidence may be permitted to do something that she knows would be impermissible if she occupied a perspective of complete evidence. In this paper, I argue that this contrast is explained by a disanalogy between the role played by belief in epistemic deliberation and the role played by action in practical deliberation. Epistemic deliberation may be closed by adopting other attitudes than belief, whereas in general, practical deliberation can only be closed by endorsing some course of action. Thus, when there are pressures to close some practical deliberation, agents have to make a decision about what to do even if they lack relevant information. By contrast, lacking relevant evidence, agents may always refrain from forming a belief and close instead their epistemic deliberation by adopting some other attitude. (shrink)

Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I (...) claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question. (shrink)

A força actual da microeconomia enquanto chave para a compreensão da vida económica, e a predominância dos mercados sobre as instituições políticas na nova ordern mundial, coloca novos desafios à Ética Económica. Por outro lado, urna teoria da Justiça focalizada em instituições macrosociais dificilmente poderá responder de modo adequado a tais desafios. Neste sentido, o presente artigo tenta sobretudo explorar as enormes potencialidades associadas com a teoria Escolástica da Justiça, teoria essa que focaliza a sua atenção nas decisões dos agentes (...) económicos. Ora é precisamente em ordern a atingir tal objectivo que o autor do artigo recorre ao pensamento de Francisco de Vitoria como principal fonte de inspiração. Mostra-se, desta forma, até que ponto a tradição Escolástica de reflexão sobre o problema da Justiça se revela perfeitamente integrável nos temas e nas preocupações éticas associadas com a microeconomia do nosso tempo. De resto, é por isso mesmo que o autor do artigo sugere este tipo de abordagem como uma das linhas de resposta mais promissoras aos desafios lauçados ao pensamento, e à reflexão ética em particular, pelas novas realidades e pelas novas abordagens da Economia contemporânea. According to the author, the current strength of Microeconomics as a key for understanding economic life, and the predominance of markets over political institutions in the new world order, poses new challenges to Economic Ethics. On the other hand, it is also taken into account the fact that a theory of justice focused on macrosocial institutions is not particularly well suited to undertake those challenges. The article, therefore, aims at explodng some of the potentialities of the Scholastic theory of justice, a theory that is precisely focused on the decision of economic agents. By choosing the works of Francisco de Vitoria as his main reference, the author shows how one of the most distinctive marks of the Scholastic approach consists precisely in the way it facilitates, and promotes, a close integration with Microeconomics. The final purpose of the article, therefore, is to propose such programmatic idea as a promising line of answer to the challenges that the new realities and approaches of economics are now posing anew to the ethical reflection. (shrink)

Enlightening and entertaining, _Philosophical Tales_ examines a few of the fascinating biographical details of history’s greatest philosophers and highlights their contributions to the field. By applying the true philosophical approach to philosophy itself, the text provides us with a refreshing 'alternative history' of philosophy. Opens up new philosophical debate by applying the true philosophical approach to philosophy itself Provides summaries of the most celebrated and philosophically interesting tales, their backgrounds, and assessments of the leading players Explores philosophers and schools of (...) thought in one key philosophical text to supply a solid grounding in philosophical ideas and individuals Shakes some of the foundations of philosophy with the aim of encouraging the reinvigoration of philosophy itself. (shrink)

Enlightening and entertaining, _Philosophical Tales_ examines a few of the fascinating biographical details of history’s greatest philosophers and highlights their contributions to the field. By applying the true philosophical approach to philosophy itself, the text provides us with a refreshing 'alternative history' of philosophy. Opens up new philosophical debate by applying the true philosophical approach to philosophy itself Provides summaries of the most celebrated and philosophically interesting tales, their backgrounds, and assessments of the leading players Explores philosophers and schools of (...) thought in one key philosophical text to supply a solid grounding in philosophical ideas and individuals Shakes some of the foundations of philosophy with the aim of encouraging the reinvigoration of philosophy itself. (shrink)

We discuss the role of practical costs in the epistemic justification of a novice choosing expert advice, taking as a case study the choice of an expert statistician by a lay politician. First, we refine Goldman’s criteria for the assessment of this choice, showing how the costs of not being impartial impinge on the epistemic justification of the different actors involved in the choice. Then, drawing on two case studies, we discuss in which institutional setting the costs of partiality can (...) play an epistemic role. This way we intend to show how the sociological explanation of the choice of experts can incorporate its epistemic justification. (shrink)

The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form ‘x is beautiful’ as involving a double speech act: first, a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker’s aesthetic standard, along the lines of naive contextualism; second, the speaker’s recommendation that her audience comes to share her appraisal of x as beautiful. We suggest that attributions of beauty tend to convey such a recommendation due to the role that aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancing (...) interpersonal coordination. Aesthetic practices are driven by a disposition towards the attunement of attitudes and aesthetic recommendations contribute to forwarding such attunement. Our view is motivated by an attempt to satisfy the following set of desiderata: to account for the experiential nature of aesthetic judgments, disagreements in aesthetic debates, and the normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse, as well as to avoid appealing to error theory and realist ontological commitments. (shrink)